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drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
on the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the 
Council (Doc. 254/77) concerning regulations relating to the application for the 
year 1978 of the generalized tariff preferences of the European Community 
Rapporteur: Miss C. FLESCH 
PE 49.985/fin. By  letter of  18  August  1977  the  President of the Council  of the 
European  Communities  requested  the European  Parliament,  pursuant to 
Article  43  and  113  of the  EEC  Treaty,  to deliver  an  opinion on.: the proposals 
from  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  to  the  Council 
concerning  regulations  relating to the  application  for  the  year  1978 
of  the  generalized tariff preferences  of the  European  Community. 
On  6  September 1977 the President of the  Europ3an Parliament  referred  these 
proposals  to  the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  as  the  Committee 
responsible  and  to the  Committee  on  Agriculture,  the  Committee  on 
External  Economic  Relations  and  the  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary 
Affairs  for  their opinions. 
On  21  September  ~n the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation 
appointed  Miss  Flesch  rapporteur. 
It considered  the draft report at its meeting of  28  September  1977 
and  adopted it unanimously. 
Present:  Mr  Bersani,  acting chairman;  Mr  Lagorce  and  Mr  Sandri, 
vice-chairmen;  Mr  Broeksz,  Lord  Castle,  Mr  Dewulf,  Mr  Dondelinger, 
Mr  Glinne,  Mr  Jakobsen,  Mr  Lezzi,  Mr  Martinelli,  Mr  Nolan  and  Mr  Price. 
The  opinions  of the  Committee  on  Agriculture,  and  the  Committee 
on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  are  attached. 
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The  corrunil.:tee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  hereby  submits  to the 
European  Parliament  the  following  motion  for  a  resolution together 
with  explanatory statement: 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
embodying  the  opinion of the  European  Parliament  on  the piDposals  from 
the  Commission  of the  European  Communities  to the Council concerning 
r:e gulations  relating to the  application  for  the  yea:r:  1978  of the 
generalized tariff preferences  of  the  European  Commt~ni1:y 
The  European  Parliament, 
- having  reg~rd to  the  prrposals  from  the  Commission of the  European 
Communities  to  the  Council  (COM(77)  330  final); 
- having  regard  to  the  Communication  from  the  Commission  of the 
European  Communities  to  the Council  on  the  future  development 
of  the  European  Community's  generaUzed  tariff preferences  (COM(75) 
17  final) ; 
-having been  consulted by the  Council  pursuant  to Article  43~d 113  of 
the  EEC  Treaty  (Doc.  245/77); 
1  2 
- referring to its resolutions  of  6  October  1970  ,  9  June  1971  , 
13  December  19733 ,  12  July  19744 ,  17  October  19745 ,  16  October  19756 , 
and  14  October  1976
7
; 
- having regard  to  the  report of the  Committee  on  Development  and 
Cooperation  and  the  opinions  of the  Committee  on  Agriculture, 
and  the  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs  (Doc.302/?7); 
l.  Regrets  that  compared with  1977,  the Community's  offer of  generalized 
preference.s  for  191-8  is  very modest  in extent  and  shows  no 
significant  improvements; 
2.  Recognizes  that the  Commission's  proposals  had  to be  fixed  at  a 
relatively  low  level because of  the persistent difficulties in the 
Conununity's  economic  and  social situation but  fears  that the planned 
increase will  not  even  be  sufficient to compensate  for  the  monetary 
depreciation  caused by  inflation; 
3.  Considers  this situation all the more  serious because the  system of 
preferences  supplements  the  Convention  of  Lome  and  is  a  decisive 
instrument  in  the  Community's  development  policy;  is  aware,  however, 
lOJ  No.  c  129,  26.10.1970. p.l3 
20J No.  c  66,  1.7.1971,  p.l5 
30J  No~  c 
~  9.1.1974,  p.55  .£., 
40J  No.  c  93,  7.8.1974,  p.9l 
5 
6o,J  No.  c  ]40,  l3.ll.l974,p.42 
OJ  No.  c  257,  10.11.1975,  p.30 
7oJ  No.  c  2-59'  4.11.1976,  p.27 
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countries  make  similar efforts  and  are  prepared  to  accept  greater 
responsibility; 
4.  Welcomes  the inclusion of  a  further  eleven  processed agricultural 
products  in the  system of preferences,  but considers  this offer 
inadequate  and therefore calls on the Commission to review its 
proposal,  since  past  experience has  shown  that the  import of these 
products,  which  originate mainly  in tropical countries,  causes 
virtually no  disturbance on  the  EEC  market  and  is of particular 
advantage  to the industrially backward developing countries; 
5.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission wishes  to constitute 
2~/o reserve  shares,  of  sensitive products,  which will facilitate 
exports  from  the  developing countries  to the  EEC; 
6.  Supports  the  arrangements  proposed by the  Commission  according 
to which  the  poorest  countries will not be  required  to  reintroduce 
duties if they  exceed  the  ceilings  for  semi-sensitive  a~d non-
sensitive products  and  considers  this the only substantial 
improvement  in the  1978  system of preferences; 
7.  Requests  the  Commission  to  draw  up  the  rules  of origin in the 
simplest  possible  terms  since  excessively complicated provisions 
adversely affect the  system of  preferences; 
B.  Urges  the  commission  to open  nPgoi;iations  at worlcl level with  a 
view to  amending  the  list of beneficiary countries, 
because  the  developing countries which  have  reached  an  adequate  level 
of competitivity enjoy  an  excessive  share of preferential trade, 
thus  distorting the  purpose of the  system of preferences; 
9.  Deplores  the  fact that in the  last few  years  the  available preferences 
have  been utilized only to  some 60%  and  this to the  disadvantage  of 
the  poorest countries; 
10.  Hopes  that,  in  the  competent  interna.tional  nego\l.ia:tiPg.bodies,  the 
community will propose ·a11  necessary measures  to  achieve -harmonization 
of the  various  preference  systems,  since this would  result in  a 
qualitative  improvement  of the  system; 
11.  Requests  the  OOmmissior,,  •'When  submitting its proposals  for  19]9, :to 
report on  how  the  Community  shou""l'd  implement  the  proposals  :r:-e•garding 
generalized tariff preferences which  were  adopted  at the  North-South 
Conference  in Paris; 
12.  Instructs its President  to  forward  this resolution  and  the  report  of  its 
committee  to  the  council  and  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  and 
to  UNCTAD. 
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EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT 
1.  A  preferential tariff is  a  tariff rate which  is  lower  than the 
most-favoured-nation rate;  it may  even be  a  zero rate.  The  generalized 
system of  preferences which was  ultimately agreed  at the  1969  UNCTAD 
at the  request of  the  developing countries was  and  is the expression of 
a  change  in  the  principles  of world  trade  carried out  for  the benefit 
of the  'third world'.  'Nithout  any  reciprocal concessions,  the 
industrialized nations  agreed  to grant  preferences which  would be 
totally non-discriminatory.  These  non-reciprocal  and  non-discriminatory 
preferences were  to assist in the  attainment of three objectives:  an 
increase  in  the  export  revenue of  the developing countries,  the 
promotion  of  their industrialization  and  an  acceleration in their 
economic  growth  rate.  The  generalized tariff preferences were  also  to 
contribute  towards  the  gradual  adjustment  of economic  relations between 
the  industrializad nations  and  developing countries  so  as  to create  a 
more  balanced  and  harmonious  relationship between  the  north  and  south, 
corresponding  to  present  conditions.  These  three objectives,  laid down 
in 1968,  appear  somewhat  outdated  today,  because  although  they  include 
such  important  aspects  as  industrialization  and  acceleration of 
economic  growth  they  take  no  account  of  such  significant areas  as  the 
promotion  of  agriculture,  family  planning,  redistribution of  income, 
creation of  employment  and  land  reform,  all of which  are of  fundamental 
importance  for  a  successful development  policy. 
2.  However,  the  generalized  system of  preferences which  the third 
world  ultimately  achieved  in  1969  after years  of negotiations  and  by which 
it set great  store was  from the  outset limited  in  its practical 
implementation.  Its duration was  limited  to ten years  (the  GATT  waiver 
expires  on  25  ,June  1981)  and  it vias  not binding.  Moreover,  although the 
s ys tern  of  preferences  was  accepted  in  principle  in February  1968,  no 
practical measures  were  taken  to  implement it before July  1971.  Each 
industrialized nation was  free  to  designate  the  products  and  beneficiary 
countries  which  were  to  enjoy  tariff preferences.  Apart  from  this, this 
system was  not  tc  hamper  further  tariff reductions  through  new  multilateral 
negotiations.  Tariff preferences were  to be  extended  to  the  largest 
possible  number  of  processed  agricultural  produc~  from  chapters  1-24 of the 
CCT  and  to  industrial  semi-manufactures  and  manuf act\r es  from  chapters 
2 5-99  of  the  CC'l'.  However,  it is  common  knowledge  that  some  export  products 
which  are  important  for  the  developing countries were  excluded  from this 
arrangement;  many  agricultural  products were  even excluded  from  the  system 
by  a  number  of  industrialized nations  in  an  effort to  protect their own 
agriculture.  The  question  thus  arises  as  to whether  the  generalized  system 
of preferences  can  be  described  as  'generalized'  or  even  as  a  'system'. 
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1  July  1971  it became  the  first group  of  industrialized nations  to put 
the  generalized  system of  preferences  into effect.  Since  then,  the 
Community  has  improved  the  system each  year  and  constantly extended  :iJB 
scope.  It may  even be  said that  compared with  the ather  industrialized 
nations,  the  Community has been  the  pioneer  in this  field.  Above  all, 
it made  every effort to regard  the  generalized  preferences  not merely 
as  a  limited  trade  measure but  also  as  a  component  part  and  instrument 
of its genera]  development  policy.  However,  it must be noted that 
the  Community  system itself contains  some  restrictions.  Maximum  import 
amounts  (ceilings)  were  fixed,  and  the  import  of  'sensitive'  products, 
i.e.  goods  which  compete directly with  domestic  products,  was  limited 
by tariff quotas.  Moreover,  a  theoretical ceiling of  Sif/o  of the total 
preferential  imports  of  a  product was  fixed,  above  '"'hich  no  supplier 
may  import  at preferential rates,  although  in pract,ice  this  frequently 
worked  out  at  20-30%. 
4.  Of  the other  major  industrialized nations,  Japan has  applied  a 
preference  scheme  since  l  August  1971  and  has  also  improved it 
gradually  over  the  past  few  years.  ·rhe  Canadian  system  came  into 
force  on  ]  ,luly  l<J74.  The  basi,;  fnr  the  American  system of  preferences 
was  laid  in •ritle V  of  the  new  Trade  Law  of  1974.  It came  into  force 
in January  1976.  Australia  has  granted  preferences  for  certain 
manufac'tlr ed  and  processed products  from  the  developing countries  since 
1966  and  considerably  extended its system of preferences  on 
1 
1  January  1974  This  demonstrates  that of  the  leading industrialized 
nations  in the world,  the  European  Community  and  Japan have been  applying 
this  system of preferences  for  a  longer  period  especially when  compared 
with  the economic  might  of  the  USA. 
5.  The  Commission's  proposals  concern  the  regulations  required to 
apply  the generalized  system of preferences  for  1978  for  processed 
agricultural  products  and  industrinl  semi-manufactures  and  manufactures 
originating  in  developing  countries.  These  draft ragulations  take  account 
of  the  Comnnmity  offer  en  generalized preferences  made  to  UNCTAD  in  1969. 
The  proposals  concern  the  detailed  rules  for  applying the  generalized 
preferences  to  a  number  of  processed  agricultural products  of Chapters 
l-24  of  the  CCT  and  to  all industrial  semi-manufactures  and  manufactures 
of Chapters  25-99  of the  CCT.  Iron  and  steel products  covered by  the 
ECSC  Treaty are  dealt with  in  special draft decisions  opening tariff 
preferences  in  accordance with  the  s arne  rules  as  those  adopted  for  other 
indllitrial products,  hut without  prejudice to the  special administrative 
rules  applying  to  ECSC  products. 
1other countries  applying the  GSP  are:  Austria,  Finland,  Norway,  Sweden, 
Sv1itzerland  and  New  Zealand. 
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extended  and  improved  its system of preferences.  This  continual 
improvement was  decided  in principle at the Conference of Heads  of State 
or Government  of  the  Member  States  and  the States  acceding to  the  European 
Communities  held  in Paris  from  19  - 21  October  1972.  At  that time the 
Conference  called on  the institutions of the  Community  and  the  Member 
States to progressively  adopt  an  overall policy of  development  cooperation 
on  a  world-wide  scale  comprising  in particular the  improvement  of generalized 
preferences with  the  aim  of  achieving  a  steady increase  in  imports  of 
manufactures  from  the  developing  countries. 
7.  In  1977  the  Community  raised its offer considerably,  by  39%.  But 
for  1978 the  Community's  volume will ·rise by only  2.5%,  from  6,230 million 
u.a.  to 6,400 million  EUA1 
for  preferential imports,  an offer which  can  only 
be described  as  extremely modest.  It is calculated  so  finely that in all 
probability it will  not  compensate  for  monetary depreciation caused by 
inflation.  In  frs  Communication  to  the Council,  the  Commission  stresses 
that given  the current economic  situation in the  Community,  it is not 
possible to  introduce  new  and  substantial  improvements  into the  GSP;  this 
is  principally due  to  the  fact  that the Community's  industrialized partners 
have  not  made  comparable  efforts.  It should be recalled in this context 
that  the  European  Community's  offer on  tariff preferences  is dependent 
on  the clause which  states  that the Community  drew  up  the offer on  the 
a  ssumption  that all the major  industrialized nations  of the  OECD  would 
not  only participate in granting preferences but also  make  comparable 
efforts.  Par1iament  agrees with  the Commission  on  this matter because  in 
comparison with  the  previous  year,  the  international  and  domestic  economic 
situation has  deteriorated rather  than  improved.  In  negotiating the  new 
system of  preferences,  therefore,  the  interests of EEC  producers  as well 
as  those of  the  ACP  states must be balanced  against  the  interests of those 
countries benefiting from  the  system of preferences.  There  is no  doubt 
that the  application of  the  EEC  system of preferences has  already led  and 
can still lead  to  considerable competition  for  Community production  in 
certain sectors.  In the difficult economic  situation,  characterized by  an 
extremely precarious  employment  situation in  some  of the Community's  major 
i  ndustrial sectors  and  by drastic  economy  measures  taken by the 
governments  of  the  Member  States,  the  public,  especially the  large  number 
of  unemployed,  would hardly accept  an  increase  in  problems  caused by exports 
1Pursuant  to  the Council  Decision  adopting  the  European Unit of Account 
(EUA)  in  1978,  in particular for  the  Common  Customs  Tariff,  the  EUA  is 
used  for  the  1978  GSP  instead of  the  previous u.a. 
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treatment.  In the  final  analysis  such  a  policy would benefit neither 
the  industrialized nations  nor  the  developing countries.  However,  if the 
volume  of  preferential imports  cannot be  increased because  of the difficult 
economic  situation,  Parliament must  at  least insist that concrete 
measures  are  taken  to  ensure  that the  fullest possible use  is made  of 
concessions  already granted. 
8.  Of  the total  volume  of 6,400 million  EUA,  1,300 million  EUA  will be 
earmarked  for  agricultural products.  The  Commission proposal provides  for 
the  inclusion of  11  new  agricultural  products  so that the preferential list 
now  contains  307  products  to  a  value  of 1,300 million  EUA,  as  against 1,240 
million u.a.  in  1977.  Among  the  new  products  are horses  for  slaughter,  certain 
kinds  of  crustaceans,  dried garlic,  tropical  fruits  and  certain kinds  of 
fruit  and  vegetables  during  the winter  season1  The  trend  in processed 
agricultural products within  the  framework  of the  generalized system of 
preferences over  the past  few years  is shewn  in the  following table: 
Year  Number  of  products  Value  (in m u.a.) 
1971  147  22 
1972  147  45 
1973  147  65 
1974  187  450 
1975  220  600 
1976  241  1,000 
1977  296  1,235 
1978  307  1,300 
9.  In  1977,  the generalized preference  scheme  was  significantly improved 
in the  agricultural  sector by  a  community offer on tropical products  made  in 
the  GJ\TT  multilateral trade negotiations.  The  1977  GSP,  compared with  1976, 
contains  46  new  products  and  70  improvements  in the preferential limits resulting 
in an  in:rease  in  the volume  of  imports  from  1,000 million to  1,240 million u.a. 
The  other  industrialized nations have  not  made  the  same  efforts as the 
community  and  - as  the  Commission  stresses  in the  proposals  - it is 
consequently very difficult for  the  Community to make  further  concessions  in 
view of the  current  economic  situation. 
1  See  Annex  A  to  Doc.  COM(77)  330  final of  29  July  1977,  p.  113  ff. 
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areas: 
- the  inclusion of  11  new  products  and 
the  inclusion of  a  limited reserve  share  in all the tariff 
quotas  O?ened under  the  system of preferences  for  agricultural 
products  so that the  percentage of the  import quotas  can, 
where  necessary,  be  increased. 
The  new  products  to be  included  in  the proposed  community offer are 
processed products whose  raw materials originate principally in  the tropical 
countries or are delivered  in winter.  The  experience of the  past  few  years 
has  shown  that  increasing the preferences granted to this kind of product 
will not  lead to  any  major  disturbance of the  Communit.y' s  agriculture or 
industry.  Howev9r,  there  are  no  concrete references to this in the 
Commission's  Communication.  Parliament has  already emphasized in previous 
opinions  that the  Community's  efforts  should  in particular benefit the  least 
developed  countries which  in general produce  only agricultural products. 
Since  in  comparison with  previous years the  increase  in  the  1978 offer must  be 
considered moderat_e,  Parliament calls on  the  Commission  to review its proposal 
once  more  to  see  whether  it could  not  also  jnclude  in  the list those products 
which  are mainJy  produced by  the  poorest  countries  and which  do  not  compete 
with the  Community's  agricultural production.  In this context it must  be 
noted that the  agricultural protectionism practised by the industrialized 
nations  and  in part any  special preferences granted affect the export revenue 
of  the very poorest countries  since as  a  rule  these have  only one  or  two 
processed agricultural products to offer. 
10.  Out  of  the  total volume  of  6,400 million EUA,  5,100 million are provided 
for  industrial  semi-manufactures  and  manufactures of Chapters  25-99  of  the 
CCT,  compared with  4,990 million  in  1977-.  For  the  GSP  scheme  as it will 
affect  industrial products  in 1978,  the  commission  proposes basically that the  1977 
system  should be retained,  although with  a  number  of  improvements  and 
administrative  adjustments.  In its proposal,  the  commission  notes  expressly 
and  the  European  Parliament  is  in  full  agreement here  - that the acceptance 
of  an  even  greater burden  resulting  from  generalized preferences  presupposes 
a  broader distribution of the  costs  among  the  industrialized nations which 
participate in the generalized system of preferences. 
11.  The  generalized  system of preferences  authorizes  the  duty-free  importation 
of all industrial semi-manufactures  and  manufactures 1f.'ithout  exception up  to 
a  fixed  ceiling which  is equal to  the  volume  of  imports  from  the beneficiary 
countries  during  one  reference year  together with  an  additional  amount 
equivalent  in principle to  5%  of the  imports  from  non-beneficiary countries 
i.e.,  the  industrialized nations.  In  the  1978  system of  preferences,  the 
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the  1975  statistics are  taken  into account  for  the calculation of the additional 
amounts,  since,  with the exception of  textiles,  this raises the ceilings for 
industrial  goods.  For  those  cases where  the application of this rule would 
result in  a  lower  ceiling,  the  existing ceiling is retained.  On  the  other 
hand,  for  goods  where  the  ~alculations result  in  an  excessive rate of  increase, 
the ceiling  increases by  a  maximum  of  50%.  For  some  goods  other than textile 
products  - iron and  steel and  petroleum products,  footwear  and  plywood  -
the ceilings  remain unaltered at their present level,  i.e.  the status  quo 
is maintained,  because  of the  extremely difficult situation of these 
industrial  sectors  in  the  Community. 
12.  Although  only a  moderate  increase  in  the  volume  of the generalized 
preferences  is possible because  of the difficult  econo~ic situation  in the 
Community,  the  Commission  nevertheless  proposes  two essential  improvements 
which  are of exceptional  significance  for  the  way  the  GSP  functions.  For 
sensitive goods,  which  have hitherto been subject  to  a  tariff quota  system, 
according to which  they were  allocated  in  national quota,  shares, 
arrangements have  been  made  to build up  a  reserve  share which  should  simplify 
1  the  functioning  of the quota  procedure  In  the industrial  sector,  the  number 
of tariff quotas  for  sensitive products,  for which  a  reserve  share of  20% 
is laid  down,  is to rise  from  6  to  12.  Exceptions  are tariff quotas  for 
plywood,  textiles and  ECSC  products.  This  Community  reserve of sensitive products 
may  be  considered  as  a  relief measure  for  imports  from  the  developing countries 
into  the  EEC. 
As  regards  the  ceilings  for  semi-sensitive  and  non-sensitive  goods,  the 
Commission  submits  an  important proposal  that the  least developed countries  -
i.e.  those  included  in  the list established by United Nations  Resolution 
No.  3487  (XXX)  of  12  December  1975  - should be  exempt  from  reintroduction of 
the  duty  if they exceed  the  ceiling.  In other words,  the ceiling arrangement 
is waived.  This  represents  a  substantial  improvement  in  the  system of 
preferences  as  it affects  the  poorest  countries  and  Parliament therefore calls 
on  the Council  tc accept unconditionally this  Commission  proposal.  In  1977 
these  countries  received  a  duty  exemption  under  the buffer arrangement  (maximum 
exports which  each beneficiary country could make:  in general an  additional  50%  -
in many  cases- 20-30% of the  ceiling).  In  1977,  under  a  special  arrangement, 
70%  of  the  ceiling for  a  large  number  of textile products was  reserved  for 
these  countries vis-a-vis the  competitive countries. 
13.  The  European textile industry has been  in  a  serious  crisis for  many  years 
now  and it is this industrial  sector which  most  fears  the  effects of the 
generalized preferences.  It should be  noted  in this  context,  that the 
1  The  GSP  for  industrial  goods  at present  comprises  46  sensitive products,  131 
semi-sensitive  products  and  some  1700  non-sensitive products 
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Japan's,  which  inr.ludes  textile products  in its list of generalized preferences. 
The  commission  had  always  considered  that special measures  could be  taken  to 
avoid  adverse  effects on  the  European  textile  industry,  although it cannot be 
denied that  recently its difficulties have  increased rather than  decreased. 
For  1978,  the  Commission  proposes  maintaining the  status quo  in  the  textile 
sector,  i.e.  there  can  be  no  increase  in the  ceiling  (except  for  carpets). 
Because  of the  continuing difficulties in  the  textile industry,  this measure, 
seems  justified especially as  the  outcome  must  be  awaited of the negotiations 
for  the  renewal  of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.  Major  difficulties have arisen 
here  and they will not be  concluded before  the  end  of the year.  The  Commission 
intends to establish  a  connection  between  the Agreement  concluded  in December  197~ 
on  international trade  in textiles  (Multi-Fibre Arrangement)  and  the  generalized 
preferences.  This  can  only be  described  as  a  logical  step. 
14.  The  arrangements  introduced  in  1977  will be  retained  in  1978.  There  is 
no  provision  for  the  introduction  of  a  reserve  share  in the tariff quotas 
for  textile products.  In  1977  the  Commission  had  proposed increasing the  ceiling 
by  5%  compared  with  1976.  To  simplify the textile arrangements,  the  remaining 
cotton  and  non-cotton textiles were  treated identically and this led to a 
reduction  and  simplification  in the  regulations.  For  28  sensitive textile 
products,  two  ceilings were  introduced,  one  of  30%  reserved for  the most 
competitive  recipient countr  i.e's  and  one  of  70%  for  the  other recipient 
countries with  a  normal  maximum  of  50%  for  any  one  country.  This  proposal  is 
to be  warmly  welcomed  because it enables  the  poorest  developing  countries to 
make  better use  of the  concessions  granted by  the  Community.  This  restrictive 
attitude  t.·.wards  all competitive  recipient countries in the  Far East will 
also put  an  end  to the  previous unfair  treatment of  !long  Kong,  because  the 
other Far Eastern  countries are  also  extremely  competitive. 
15.  Two  other  proposed  measures  are worthy of mention:  in return  for  the 
voluntary restraint agreements  negotiated with  India  (jute  and  coir)  and 
Bangladesh  (jute),  the tariff suspension  accorded by  the  Community will be 
raised on  1  J·anuary  1.9713  from  BO  - 100%,  although  originally,  complete 
tariff suspension was  not  to begin until  1  July 1978. 
It is proposed  to  extend to Romania  the benefit of  preferences  for  a 
number  of  additional  products.  In this way  the  Community  recognizes  the  economic 
difficulties  ~1icl1 that  country  is currently experiencing. 
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European  Parliament  the  Commission  includes  in its Communication  an  estillB te 
of  the  reduction  in  customs  duties attributable to  the  generalized system of 
preferences.  The  reduction  in  customs duties  amounted  to  257  m u.a.  in 
1976  and  300m u.a.  in  1977.  Given  that  the overall value  of the offer 
on  generalized preferences under  the  1978  scheme  is being  increased to' 6,400 
million  EUA  and  that utilization should  reach  55%  of this  amount,  the  Commission 
calculates  a  reduction  in  customs  receipts  for  1978  in  the  order of  304 
million  EUA  on  the basis of  an  average  rate of  8.5%  for  the customs  duties 
applicable.  To  this must  be  added  further  costs of various measures  designed 
to increase the  efficiency of  the  generalized  system of preferences 
(information  seminars  in the  developing  countries  and  in Brussels,  a 
documentation  centre,  publication of  a  guide  (around  230,000  EUA)  etc). 
These  figures  demonstrate that the  concessions  granted by the  European  community 
under  the  general~zed system of  preferences  are  not  inconsiderable. 
In  its Communication,  the  Commission  rightly points  out  that these 
calculations  are merely  given  as  an  indication of the  order of  magnitude  and 
offer  a  point  of  reference.  They would  not  normally be  included  in a 
financial  statement  requiring very  accurate  data.  Parliament must  therefore 
comply with the  Commission's  request to  deal with these  figures  very  carefully 
and  not  consider  them  as  representing the definitive costs of  the  scheme  of 
generalized preferences  for  1978. 
17.  The  definition  of rules of origin  is of great  in,portance  for  the  smooth 
functioning of  the  generalized  system of preferences.  The  Commission  proposes 
that the  rules  of origin  in  force  for  1977,  which  had  already been  carried 
over  from  1976,  should be  maintained  in  1978.  The  Community  system of rules of 
origin has the  advantage  of  including  the  concept of  cumulative origin. 
The  positive effect of this  rule  is that it encourages  regional  integration 
0etween the beneficiary countries  since  the  rules of  cumulative  origin 
stipulate that all the  countries benefitting from  the  GSP  form  a  single  zone  so that 
goods  enjoying tariff preferences  can  include  components  originating in 
various  countries belonging  to  'common  markets'.  Cumulative  systems  exist, 
for  example,  for  exports  from  'conunon  markets' such  as  Central America,  the 
Andes  group  and  the  ASEAN  countries. 
The  rules  of  origin  in  the  Japanese  system of  preferences  are  less  advantageous 
than  those  of  the  EEC  because  Japan excludes  cumulative  origin in granting 
preferences,  i.e.  for  a  certificate of origin  for  the  concession of generalized 
preferences,  all components  of  a  product up  to  a  fixed  percentage of  added value 
must  come  from  the  actual  country of origin.  In view of the  importance of 
rules  of  origin  for  the  functioning  of the  system of preferences,  Parliament calls 
on  the  Commission  to  take  all possible  technical measures to  improve  the  system, 
since technically complex  rules  of origin hinder  rather  than  encourage  trade. 
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result in  reverse preferences as,  for  example,  in  the  Community  and Japanese 
systems.  This  may be  explained as  follows:· materials which  are  imported by 
the recipient  countries  from  the  EEC  or Japan  and  processed there are 
subsequently treated as  materials originating in  the  developing  countries  and 
the  manufactures  can  be  imported at  a  preferential rate  into the country 
granting preferences.  This  measure  cannot be  considered as  restrictive: 
rather  is it equivalent to  sharing  the tariff advantages  between the 
industrialized nation  (increased sales)  and  the  developing country which  can 
enjoy preferential  treatment  for its exports. 
19.  It is extremely regrettable that the  Commission's  communication  contains  no 
proposals  for  amendment  of  the list of recipient countries.  Parliament has 
repeatedly called for  the list of favoured  countries to be adjusted in order 
to prevent certain injustices.  It has been  an  open  secret for years that the 
list of  countries  enjoying  generalized tariff preferences1  includes  some  which 
hav0  already attained a  relatively high  degree  of  industrialization and whose 
products  are  competitive.  This  undermines  and distorts the generalized system 
of preferences because  the  most  highly developed countries take  a 
disproportionately high  share  of preferential trade  in  comparison with the 
poorest  developing  countries.  From  this angle,  the United States'  system of 
preferences  seems  more  logical because it excludes,  for  example,  the wealthy 
OPEC  countries  from  preferential concessions.  If one  considers that the  GSP 
was  established to  increase  the volume  of trade of the  developing countries,  then 
it is astonishing to find  in the list of countries  enjoying generalized 
tariff preferences  names  such  as  Bahrain,  Iran,  Yugoslavia,  Kuwait  and  South 
Korea,  to mention  only  a  few.  Amending  the list of  countries  enjoying preferences 
is certainly  u  very  dc.l icatc matter,  since political considerations were 
doubtlessly an  important  factor  when  it was  drawn  up.  However,  this list could 
be revised on  the basis of objective economic criteria.  Given  the  statistical 
data  which  the  Community has  at its disposal, this  should present  no  special 
difficulties.  It would  also be  useful  to  amend  the  list of countries enjoying 
preferences  in  cooperation with UNCTl\D,  which  largely influenced these decisions. 
Should UNCTAD  not be  prepared to  cooperate with  the Community here,  consideration 
should be  given  as  to whether  a  new list could be  drawn  up  in conjunction with 
other  industrialized nations which  also grant  concessions. 
1  see Annex  c,  list elf  developinq countries and territories enjoying 
generaJizcd  tari U  prefcn,ncc:s  (COM(77)  JJO  final,  pp.  11  and  12) 
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should observe  a  certain  amount  of  trading discipline.  In particular, 
excessive  expansion of exports or  dumping within the  Community  should be 
avoided otherwise  the  Community's  economic  power will be  reduced as  inevitably 
will also  EEC  aid  for  thepoorest  developing  countries.  The  Community  should 
also try to obtain  from  the beneficiary countries certain guarantees of 
stability and  security of  supply and  investments.  Moreover,  granting  trade 
preferences to  those  countries which  do  not  respect the standards  laid down 
by the  International Labour  Organization  (ILO)  for  the  protection of  employees 
should be  reviewed. 
21.  The  figures  submitted by the  Commission  over  the last  few  years  show  clearly 
that the  generalized preferences  only partially achieve their objective because they 
mainly benefit only  a  small  group of countries which have  already reached 
a  certain economic  level  and  whose  products  are  competitive  on  the  international 
markets.  Consequently,  efforts must  be  stepped up to ensure that the  preferences 
are of  more  substantial benefit to the  least developed countries.  The 
immediate  priority is to differentiate between  genuine  developing  countries 
and  the'pseudo-developing countries'.  The  particular difficulty here  is to draw 
up objective  cr~t.eria  for  a  genuine  developing country.  The  term  'under-
developed  countries'  would  indeed be  more  appropriate because strictly speaking 
the  term  'developing country'  could be  applied  to every country.  For 
psychological  reasons  and  in  deference to national prestige,  however,  the 
term  '  under-developed countries'  is rarely used.  The  frequent  equation: 
developing  country  =  poor  country is erroneous,  since  although developing countries 
are  poor  countries,  poor  countries  are  not always  developing countries.  In 
developing  co~ntries,  the  available productive  forces  are currently not 
being  fully exploited:  productivity is  low  and  the  per  capita  domestic  product 
correspondingly  low  also.  A higher  domestic  product  could be  achieved by  the 
available productive  forces  if the  ratio of the  production  factors  to each 
other were  not  so  disadvantageous  i.e.  a  relatively large  labour  force  and 
comparatively little capital.  Under-development  can be  overcome  if efforts 
are  made  to  improve  the ratio of the  production  factors.  On  the other hand, 
developed  countries  can still be  poor because  they  lack  productive  forces 
even  though  the  available  resources  are being fully exploited. 
22.  At  all events,  there  is  as yet  no  definition of  the  term  'developing 
country'  which  is valid in  international  law.  Each  nation is free  to request 
generalized  preferences  as  a  developing  country or  to grant  them  to which-
ever country it chooses.  Originally the  system of preferences was  intended 
for  the  'Group of  77',  but at present the  countries  enjoying trade preferences 
include  some  whose  relatively high  degree  of  development  cannot be denied. 
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and  availability of natural  res.:mrces  have  become  very marked  even 'trithin 
the  third world  and  may  even vary considerably within  one  and  the  same 
country.  More  specific criteria relate  only to the  25  poorest nations, 
known  as  the  'least developed  countries.'  They  have  an annual  ~3r capita 
Gross  National Product  of  less  than  $100  and  industry accounts  for  less 
than  10%  of  the  economy,  in other words  they are  mainly agricult1.1.ral 
countries with  under  20%  literacy1 
23.  It is therefore  important  for  the  EEC  to be  selective  in it.s  trc.de 
policy with  the  developing  count~ies.  Those  which  have  a  high  level of 
industrialization,  and  some  of whose  goods  are already competitive  on  the 
international market,  must be  treated as  industrialized nations  for 
certain products.  For  other export goods  which  are  not competitive  they 
could  continue  to be  treated as  developing  countries  and enjoy gene.ralizen 
preferences.  But  in the  long  run  a  blanket policy of granting generalized 
preferences  to developing  countries with relatively high  competitivity 
cannot be  tolerated because  of  its effect on  sensitive  products  and  the 
increasing unemployment  in certain sectors.  There  are  already signs 
that  some  Member  States  are  reacting against a  blanket preference  policy; 
some  have  already  introduced  import restrictions  for  sensitive  products. 
In  the  long  term such  a  policy may  be  dange reus  for  the  developing  countries 
and  could  jeopardize  the  trade  policy pursued by  the  Community's  Customs 
Union. 
24.  For  this  reason  the  Community  should  encourage  the  industries  which 
are  important  for  the  domestic  market  of  a  developing  country or  for  the 
regional  market  of  a  group of  developing  countries.  From  these  industries 
which  generally meet  local  needs  and  ut.i.liz.e  the  natural  local  advantages, 
there  is generally  a  spin-off  in  'che  establishment of  a  number  of smaller 
local  industrial,  craft and  service  industries,  and  this  is  favourable  for 
a  healthy development  policy.  A  clear distinction must  be  drawn  between 
such  industries which  are  of use  to  the  developing  countries  and  those 
which are  set up  in certain developing  countries with  a  view to exploiting 
favourable  lor::al  conditions,  in particular cheap  labour,  for  the  manufacture 
of goods  to be  exported subsequently  to  the  industrialized nations. 
They  have  no  connections with  the  domestic  market,  contribute  nothing  to 
the  development  of  the  country  in question  and benefit only the  multi-
national undertakings  which  act  as both  importers  and exporters. 
1  These  criteria were  drawn  up by  the  Development  Planning 
the  UN  Economic  and  Social Committee;  the  relevant data 
very difficult to ascertain. 
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within  the  generalized  system of preferences.  Once  the  Co~munity has 
drawn  up objective criteria,  such  products,  which are  geared  to the  needs 
of  the  multinational  investors  and  hardly  serve  the  development policy, 
must be  treated  as  products  originating  in competitive  industrialized 
nations  and  be  subject  to  the  Community's  external tariff.  The  advantag~s 
offered by  the  Community's  preference  policy must be  reserved  for  projects 
and  products which  ]IOmote  development  in  the  genuine  developing  countries. 
It is quite  unrealistic to  use  the  samE  commercial  criteria w·hen  dealing 
with  the  poor  developing  countries  and  thoss  \<1hich  have  already mads 
progress.  This unselective  approach,  which  1.n  tactical terms  mus·t  be 
described  as  injudicious,  also results  in  the  trade unions  and  the  govern-
ments  in those  Member  States which  are  fighting  large-scale  unemployment 
problems  showing  increasingly less  tmdersta.ncUng  of  the  need  for  dev€lop-
ment  aid. 
25.  In  the  past  few  years  the  Community's  preferences were  only utilized 
to a  relatively  l0\<1  level.  For  eJ<ample,  in  1974  they were  utilized to 
65%,  in  1975  to  50%  and  in  1976  to  62%.  ~he efficiency of  the  system nf 
preferences  can  only be  improved if the  poorest  developing  countries  are 
shown  how  to  use  more  efficiently the  advantages  which  their exports  can 
theoretically enjoy.  The  Commission  ~~st therefore  concentrate  its 
efforts  on  helping  the  most backward  developing  countries  to  make  better 
utilization of  their preferences,  in particular by simplifying  the 
administrative  procedure.  It is unfortunately  true  that  many  admini-
stratively backward  countries  do  not  understand  how  to apply the  system 
and  there  are  importers  in  the  Community  who  are  not  sure whether  their 
goods  come  within  the  generalized  system of preferences  or  not. 
26.  The  Commission  is proposing  both qualitative  and  quantitative 
measures  to  increase  the  degree  of utilization of  the  generalized tariff 
preferences  over  the  next  few  years.  The  programme  provides  in particular 
for  further  seminar  programmes  in Brussels,  Asia  and Latin America ,.,ith 
the  aim of  promoting  meetings  between business  operators  and  stepping up 
its  information efforts at sectoral  level  in certain beneficiary 
countries.  Apart  from  this,  the  publication of  a  practical guide  for  t~ 
application  of  the  generalized  preferences,  which  first appeared  in 
May  1977,  is  to be  continued  and  extended. 
27.  The  Commission's  intention of arranging  seminars,  setting up  a  docu-
mentation centre  and  publishing  a  guide  is useful  and  to be  approved 
since it will help the  developing  countries  to obtain  more  information  on 
the  scheme  of preferences.  However,  we  should be  under  no  illusions that 
these  measures  alone  will substantially increase  the  utilization of  thA 
scheme  of  preferences. 
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is  to be  found  in the  complexity of  the  system.  Th~ general principles 
of  the  system which  are basically simple  and  clear  have  with  time  become 
so encumbered  with  new  machinery  that in  the  last analysis,  the  existing 
system  can  only be  understood  and  interpreted by experts.  Examples  of 
this are  the  fixing  of  maximum  import  values  (ceilings),  the  limitation 
by  means  of tariff quotas  and  maximum  import  amounts.  These  advance 
limitations  account  for  the  fact  that  an  average  40% of  the quotas 
offered  remained  unused.  Furthermore,  various  mechanisms  are  not  made 
known by  the  Member  States  and  are  also administered in different ways. 
The  best example  of this  is  the  maximum  import  amount.  This  was  fixed 
in theory at  50%,  but in practice at only  20-30% of  the  total preferential 
import  of  a  product.  Beyond  this  figure,  no  supplier  could  import  this 
product  under  the  system of generalized preferences.  If  the  imports  of 
the  major  supplier  exceeded  this  amount,  then  the  additional  amount 
imported was  taxed at the  rate  applicable under  the  most-favoured  nation 
clause.  This  measure  was  intended  to  favour  the  smaller suppliers  - in 
itself a  good  idea  - but  in  practice it resulted  in  a  handicap for  the 
competitive  main  supplier.  For  example,  a  main supplier was  allowed to 
supply only  20%  in  terms  of  value  of the  maximum  import  value  or  of  a 
tariff quota with generalized preferences  instead  of the  80%  of which  he 
was  capable.  ~he smaller suppliers,  however,  could  together  supply only 
some  20%  because  of  their  lack of  production capacity.  As  a  result,  60% 
of  the  quota  offered  remained  unused.  There  is  another  striking example 
of  the  inadequate  utilization of preferences.  The  tariff quotas  are 
allocated  to  the  countries  of the  Community without  any  account being 
taken of  their  import  capacities,  officially so as  to share  equitably the 
costs  of  the  preferences  granted.  But it has  emerged  that the  Federal 
Republic  and  the  Benelux  countries,  for  example,  have  a  much  greater 
import  capacity for  goods  coming  under  the  system of  preferences  than the 
percentage  all<.)tted  to  them,  whereas  in  the  case  of  Italy and  France  the 
tariff quotas  and  maximum  import  values  were  not  taken up.  In  simple 
terms  that  means  that the beneficiary developing  countries  lost the benefit 
of that part which was  not  taken up.  Often  there  were  no  provisions  for 
a  reserve  allocation which  could  have  increased  the  percentage  of  the 
import  quotas.  This  complexity or  rather illogicality of  the  system is 
the basic reason  for  the  low  utilization of  the  GSP.  Parliament  there-
fore  calls  on  the  Commission  to concentrate  its efforts  on  improving  the 
generalized  system of  preferences  in  this  area.  The  significance  of 
seminars  and  information  campaigns  cannot  be  denied,  but they cannot  over-
come  the  complexity of  the  system  and  certain defects. 
28.  The  ACP  States  have  had  to  share  the  special preferences  granted  to 
them  for  Community  trade  with  the  generalized  system of  preferences granted 
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expressed  their  fears  at meetings  of  the  Joint Committee1  and  the  ACP-EEC 
Consultative Assembly
2 
and  spoken  of  an  'erosion'  of  the  advantages  gained 
under  the  Convention of  Lome.  It is  indeed  the  Community's  duty,  when 
granting generalized preferences,  also to maintain  the  concessions  granted 
to  the  ACP  countries  and  to  take  account  of  their legitimate  interests. 
Before  the  Council  takes  a  decision  on  the  new  generalized system of 
preferences  for  the  coming  year,  discussions. should be  held with  the 
associated  states  to  examine  any  problems  affecting particular countries 
and  products.  A  declaration  to this effect was  included  in  the  minutes 
of the  Council Decision of  6  November  1975  when  the  decision was  taken  on 
the  system of  preferences  for  1976,  according  m which,  at the  request of 
the  ACP  States  represented  in  the  bodies  of  the  Convention of  Lome,  these 
questions  WEre  to be  OiSCUSSed.  The  ACP-EEC  Council has  also decided  to 
set up  a  Working  Party to study the  effects of  the  generalized system of 
preferences  on  the  exclusive  preferences  granted to  the  ACP  States. 
29.  With  reference  to  the  critical remarks  made  by  the  ACP  States,  it 
should be  noted  that  the  GSP  has  helped  the  associated states  to  find  new 
outlets  in  those  industrialized nations  which  also apply  a  similar system. 
The  system of  special  preferences  also offers greater advantages  to  the 
associated states than  the  generalized  system of  preferences.  An  UNCTAD 
report has  also established that the  application of  a  generalized system 
of  preferences  has  not worked  to the  disadvantage  of  the  ACP  States; 
advantages  and  disadvantages  have  more  or  less balanced  themselves  out
3
• 
Here,  too,  it is pointed  out that  any  losses  from  the  previous  exclusive 
preferences  have  been  compensated by gains under  the  generalized prefer-
ences.  Moreover,  as  regards  preferences  for  which  a  uniform arrangement 
exists  for all developing  countries,  the  ACP  States  have  obtained better 
results  than  the  other developing  countries vis-a-vis  the  EEC. 
30.  There  can be  no  doubt  that  the  Community  must  fully honour  the 
commitments  entered  into by it under  the  Convention  of  Lome.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  the  Community  has  the  moral  duty  to  contribute  on  a  world-
wide  scale  to  the  alleviation of  suffering  in the  other  developing  countries, 
especially in Asia  and  South A.merica. 
complementary. 
Both  policies are  important  and 
1  See  minutes  of  the  meeting  of  6/7  June  1977  held  in Luxembourg,  CA/CP/19, 
5  July  1977 
2 
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See  paragraph  15  of  the  Motion  for  a  Resolution in the  report  drawn up by 
Lord  REAY  on  the  Annual  Report  of  the  ACP-EEC  Council of  Ministers 
(IJoc.  ACP-EEC  5/77)  and  on  current  problems  connected with  the  Lome 
Convention· (CA  10/fin.),  p. 7 
UNCTAD  Report  to  the  Special  Committee  set up  to  review  the  generalized 
preferences  which  met  in Geneva  from  27  June  to  l  July  1977 
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after  lengthy negotiations,  gave  a  positive reply to the  requests  of  the 
'Group of 77.'  Even  if the  ACP  States have  lost a  few  advantages,  the 
Community  must  maintain the  generalized  system of preferences.  However, 
Parliament  calls on  the  Commission  to  submit  figures  during  the  next  few 
months  to  show whether  and  to what  extent the  generalized preferences  have 
adversely affected  some  associated states or certain products.  Details 
should also be  given as  to  how  far  discrimination has  arisen between  the 
ACP  States  and  the  other countries of Asia  and  Latin America  which are 
included  in the  various  preference  systems. 
31.  If the  generalized system of preferences is to function satisfactorily 
in the  future,  then  the  various  sytems  applied by  the  donor  countries must 
be  harmonized;  the  varying  principles complicate  the  system unnecessarily 
and  consequently prevent  the  recipient countries  from  making  full  use  of it. 
Moreover,  only  a  uniform system can facilitate  an effective division of 
costs which  again is an essential precondition for  the qualitative  improve-
ment  of  the  preferences.  Harmonization,  which  is in  the  interests of all 
participants,  must  extend  to  the  selection of  the  recipient countries,  the 
tariff concessions,  the  rules  of origin and  the  other protective  clauses. 
It is also  important  for  the  generalized preferences  to be  coordinated 
with the  other  common  policies.  This  generalized system of  preferences 
will only become  fully effective  when  a  connection is established with  the 
industrial,  social  and  regional  policies;  this will  limit  any adverse 
effects  in certain sectors.  The  inclusion of the  system of preferences 
with  the  other policy spheres  is  important  for  the  Cor.>munity  and  for  the 
rest of  the  world. 
32.  The  Community's  generalized  system of preferences  is of great signi-
ficance  because  it supplements  the  associ~tion policy embodied  in the 
Convention of Lome.  It is,  therefore,  not  only an  instrument  for  trade 
policy but also a  part of  the  Community's  overall development  policy. 
It is  therefore  important  that the  system_be  continually extended and 
improved  and  adjusted  to  the  new  requirements  of  the  developing  countries. 
The  GSP  has  the  special advantage  of not  only  including  the  associated 
states but also developing  countries  in Latin America  and Asia.  In this 
way it can  contribute  towards  the  establishment of  a  better balance  in 
economic  relations between the  northern  and southern hemispheres. 
33.  A  few  critical remarks  in conclusion:.  although  the  phrase  generalized 
system of preferences  is always  used,  the  system is  not generalized because 
the  various  systems  of  preferences  applied vary widely.  Nor  can  the 
Community's  system be  described as  a  universal system of  preferences 
- 21  - PE  49. 985/fin. but rather  as  a  system which  grants  specific preferences  to  individual 
countries.  This  statement should  not,  however,  lead us  to believe  that 
the  preferential system  is  unimportant  for  certain countries  and  products. 
As  stated at the  beginning  of  this  report,  the  generalized system of 
preferences  has  three  objectives:  an  increase  in export revenue,  promotion 
of industrialization and  acceleration of  the  economic growth of  the 
developing  nations.  So  far,  these  three  goals  of the  GSP  have  not been 
attained globally.  Either  they  ~re not  attained at all or  else  their 
attainment  cannot be  ascribed  to the  application of  the  GSP.  The  Community 
should  therefore  explore  every possibility of  improving its system especially 
in  terms  of quality.  Studies  should be  carried out  to show  how  far  the 
original aims  of the  system of preferences  have  been achieved.  If its 
efficiency has  not fulfilled original expectations  then consideration 
should be  given  to the  possibility of offering effective  development  aid 
to promote  trade  in  the  form  of  a  direct capital transfer  - i.e.  a  grant 
equal  to the  loss  of  revenue  - or of  cash  for  specific projects,  its 
utilization to  1E  supervised by the  donor  country.  Such  an  arrangement 
would be  administratively less  complicated  and  therefore  less  expensive 
than  the  sy~tem of  preferences.  The  developing  countries  ~uld probably 
reject such earmarking  and  direct supervision  and  describe it as  'neo-
colonialism. '  However,  this  should  not prevent us  from giving  some 
thought  to the  matter. 
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of the  Committee  on Agriculture 
Draftsman  :  Mr  John  CORRIE 
On  20  September  1977  the  Committee  on Agriculture 
appointed  Mr  Corrie  draftsman. 
It considered  the draft opinion at its meeting of 
29/30 September  1977  and  adopted it by one  vote  in favour 
and  none  against,  with eleven abstentions. 
The  following  were  present  :  Mr  Bourdelles,  Acting 
Chairman;  Mr  Howell  (deputizing as draftsman  for  Mr  Corrie); 
Mr Albertini,  Mr  Andersen,  Mr  Dewulf,  Mr  Hansen,  Mr  Hughes, 
Mr  Klinker,  Mr  Kofoed,  Mr  de  Koning,  Mr  Lemp  and  Mr  Ney. 
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1.  Each  year the  Committee  on  Agriculture  is called upon  to give  its opinion 
on  the Community's  offer  of  generalized  preferences to be granted to developing 
countries. 
There  is  no  necessity to go  into  a  detailed history of the preferences 
system,  except  to state that the  Community  was  the  first to introduce genera-
Dzed  preferences  in  1971,  following the request  of the  developing  countries at 
the  UNCTAD  Conference  in  1968.  The  Community has  played  an  important role  in 
bringing about  the  acceptance of the generalized preferences  system;  prefer-
ences  are  now  offered  by Austria,  Canada,  Finland,  Japan,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Sweden,  Switzerland  and  the United  States. 
In the agricultural sector,  the  Community  applies  variable  customs  duty 
reductions  without  quantitative  limitations,  rather than  duty  free  entry with 
ceilings as  in  the  industrial sector.  For  a  number  of sensitive products, 
however,  tariff quotas  are  employed  :  raw  and  unmanufactured Virginia type 
tobacco,  certain  preserved  pineapples,  cocoa butter and  soluble coffee.  A 
Community  reserve has  been  included  in  these quotas. 
1978  offer 
2.  Since  1971,  the  Community's  offer has  been  progressively extended.  The 
offer  for  1978  in  the  agricultural sector has  been  improved  but  not  dramati-
cally. 
'rhe  volume  of trade covered  for  agricultural products will  amount  to 
1,300  m.  e.u.a ..  This  volume  has  developed  in  the  following  manner  : 
1971  22  m.  e .u.a. 
1972  45  m.  e.u.a. 
1973  65  m.  e.u.a. 
1974  450  m.  e.u.a. 
1975  600  m.  e .u.a. 
1976  1,000  m.  e.u.a. 
1977  1,235  m.  e.u.a. 
1978  1,300  m.  e.u.a. 
The  Community's  offer  for  1978  includes  eleven  new  products; 
no  improvements  for products  already listed. 
there are 
The  new  products  include  :  horses 
for  slaughter and  other horses,  certain kinds  of crustaceans  and  molluscs, 
dried garlic,  limes,  tropical fruit cocktails  and  certa.in kinds  of fruit  and 
vegetahles  during  the winter  season. 
agricultural list. 
307  products  are  now  covered  on  the 
3.  As  in  previous  years,  the  Commission's  offer  includes  a  Community tariff 
quota  for  raw  or  unmanufactured Virginia type  tobacco,  which  is  of particular 
importance  to certain  less  developed  countries  in Asia,  such  as  Sri Lanka, 
- 24- PE  49. 985/fin. India,  Malaysia,  Pakistan  and  Singapore,  thus  taking  into account the Joint 
Decla~tion of  Intent signed with these  countries  in  1972. 
The  1978  offer will also  include,  as  in  1977,  tariff quotas  for  cocoa 
butter  and  soluble  coffee,  and  for  preserved  pineapples  other than  in slices, 
half slices or  spirals.  Shares  are allocated  amongst  the Member  States, 
with  a  Community  reserve  upon  which  Member  States may  call when  their shares 
are  exhausted. 
These  quotas  are to remain  unchanged at their  1977  levels. 
4.  The  Committee  on  Agriculture  ~as stressed  in the  past  the necessity to 
develop trade with  the  developing  countries  which have  suffered the effects 
of the world  recession  to a  far greater  degree  than  the  industrialised coun-
tries.  The  products  included  in  the  Community's  offe~ do  not  directly com-
pete with  those  produced  to a  significant extent within  the Community;  and 
no  serious  problems  have  emerged  in  the past. 
should  present  no  problem. 
The  modest  increase  for  1978 
5.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of broader questions,  not  related  to the 
specific content  of the  offer,  to which  attention should  be  drawn. 
Multiplicity of  agreements 
6.  The  aim  of the preferences  system  in  the agricultu.ral sector  is•n:JI:.Stilei.ytlE!t 
of  the  GATT  negotiations,  i.e. to bring  about  a  general  increase  in world  trade, 
but also to  allow one  set of countries to increase its trade with  t·hel c:Onfmtinicy in 
relation to another set  of countries;  a  substitution  in  import  flows  takes 
place  for  products  generally not  produced  to  a  significant extent within the 
Community  certain varieties of  limes  may  be  imported  from  Mexico,  for  example, 
rather than  from  the  United  States.  The  Committee  on Agriculture believes the 
preferential system to be  valuable,  but at the  same  time  wishes to point out 
that the  existence  of  more  than  one  preferential system,  however,  may  be  a 
source  of confLict  between  the  Community  and  its various  partners,, if there  is 
not sufficient consultation when  one  set of partners  must  accept  a  reductionin 
its preferential  margin.  >· 
The  Community,  at  some  point,  will  have  to face  up  to the  probr~m$'· ofc,j· 
the  growing  multiplicity of concessionary agreements.  There,e'!!*$$'.r;elj~~~~· 
Convention,  generalized preferences,  Mediterranean agreements  and  Association 
Agreements. 
There  clearly arises  a  question whether  there should  be  much  greater 
coordination of the concessions  offered,  p~rticularly in  view of the objections 
to the  1978  offer which have  been  made  by  the ACP  countries.  The ACP  coun-
tries have  seen  their preferential margins  undermined  by  the generalized 
preferences.  Greece  had  strong  reservations  concerning the size of the tariff 
quota  for  tobacco,  and  at  one  time  it seemed  possible that  she  would  place  a 
veto,  as  is her right  under  the Athens  Agreement. 
- 25- PE  49. 98"5/fin. This raises  the  question of  the  degree  of consultation which  takes place 
with  the  Commur.ity's  partners,  particularly those  in the  Lorn~  Convention  and 
those  covered by Accession Agreements. 
IMPORTS  OF  AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS 
COVERED  BY  GENERALIZED  PREFERENCES  (Mill.EUR) 
Total Extra - 9  Developing  ACP  Med. 
Countries 
1974  2188  689  270  196 
1975  2025  604  245  189 
1976  2452  795  209  244 
The  least  develo:eed  countries 
7.  The  undertu::.ning  of  the  preferences  gran ted  to  the ACP  countries is  a  par-
ticularly serious  issue.  Since the ACP  countries represent  a  block of the 
least  developed  countries,  the Committee  on Agriculture has  stated  on  numerous 
occasions  that the  least  developed  countries  should benefit primarily  from  any 
tariff concessions, and  the question  must  be asked  as to whether the  generalized 
preferences  are  now  going  against this principle.  It was  shown  clearly in 
the Explanatory Statement  for  the  1977  offer that  the most  developed  of the 
developing countries,  such  as  Yugoslavia,  South Korea,  Brazil,  Hong  Kong, 
Singapore,  India  and  Pakistan,  were  gaining  the  lion's share of the  increased 
1 
trade created  hy  the  preferences. 
The  Committee  on  Agriculture has  stressed  on  numerous  occasions that 
efforts to  improve  the  operation  of the  generalized preferences  system  should 
be  concentrated  on  poorest  countries  (as  defined  by the United Nations  list of 
12  December  1975)  by  :  selecting  products  for  inclusion  in  the Community's 
offer which  benefit primarily those countries;  and  by  simplifying administra-
tive procedures  where  possible,  while  providing advice  and  training to those 
nations. 
Given  the modest  improvement  in  the list,  little is proposed  in the first 
direction;  and,  for  the  second,  as  we  shall see  below,  Community efforts 
remain  at  a  rather  rudimentary  level. 
Presentation 
8.  This  general question  of the states which  had  gained the most  benefit 
from  the preferences  system underlines  one  major  criticism that the Committee 
on Agriculture has  of  the  presentation of this offer,  that the  Explanatory 
Statement  is totally  inadequate.  A  certain effort has  been  made  following 
criticisms made  in  the  past  by  the  Committee  on  Agriculture,  so that there 
is  now  an  indication of the  changes  in  the tariff rates  for  new  products~· 
9.  The  Committee  on  Agriculture  does  not wish  to be critical for  the  sake 
of  being critical,  but  given  the  brevity of the  Explanatory Statement,  a  theo-
logical training would  be  of great  use  in  interpreting the minimal  indications 
and hints  as  to the  problems  of the generalized preferences  system  contained 
in  the Commission's  Explanatory Statement.  The  information provided is not 
sufficient to  judge  the  impact of the preferential  system on different 
categories of developing  countries. 
!The  information provided  appears  to relate  mainly  to non-agricultural products. 
There  is  no  information provided  as  to which  categories of countries  have 
benefitted  most  from  the  list of  agricultural products. 
- 26-10.  Firstly,  there  is almost  no  indication  as  to the  extent to which genera-
lized  preferences are  used.  There  are  some  overall  figures  stating that 
b.etween  1.974  and  1976  the  utilisation rate was  65%,  50%  and  62%  respectively. 
This  is,  however,  for  all products.  There  is no  information as to the  categorie; 
of  countries which  have  benefitted  most.  from  the  agricultural products  included 
in  the Community's  offer. 
Furthermore,  there  is,  in  this proposal,  no  indication at all as  to 
changes  in  the  countries  which  have  benefitted most  from  the preferences 
system,  either by  individual countries  or  by  categories  of countries,  such 
as  the  least  developed  or  the  more  developed. 
Application  by  Member  States 
11.  On  page  5  of  this Explanatory Statement,  it states that  "the  Commission 
urges  the Member  States to coopeate  closely with  each  other  and  with the 
Commission  so  that  the  GSP  can  be  administered  as  flexibly as  possible.  All 
those  involved  in  running  it should  adopt  a  pragmatic  approach which  takes 
account  of the situation  of the products  in  quest ion.".  One  interpretation 
of this statement  is that certain Member  States are  being  excessively rigid 
in their application  of  the  preferences  system,  thereby  reducing the  extent 
to which  the beneficiary countries  can  develop their trade with the Community. 
The  Commission  should give  much  greater  detail  on  this point and  state whether 
a  serious  problem exists and,  if that  is the case,  what  concrete  steps it 
intends  to take. 
Additional  measures 
12.  The  Committee  on  Agriculture has,  on  several  occasions,  stressed that the 
leas  developed  countries  should  be  the  chief beneficiaries  of the preferences 
system.  Such  countries,  however,  have  considerable difficulties  in  fulfilling 
the  complex  administrative  requirements  in particular certificates of origin 
and  in developing  the  marketing  expertise  required  t6 expand  their  trade.·  This 
Committee  has  therefore  stressed  that there  should  be  as  great  a  simplification 
in procedures  as is possible,  and  that the  Community  should  take  ai'f" ·active role 
.. ,  in developing  the  marketing expertise of  these  countries. 
13.  The  Commission  has  a  programme  of seminars  with  an  emphasis  on  meetings 
between  business  operators  and  is stepping  up  its  information efforts at  a 
sectoral level.  The  Commission  also hopes  that  means  will  be  found  to  improve 
the possibilities  for  information  concerning preferences. 
14.  The  Committee  would  like  much  greater  information  on  these  programmes, 
their nature  and  the response  so far.  It can also  be  noted  that  the state-
ment  of the cost  of  the  supplementary measures  is  as  follows 
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c.  Publication of a  Guide  to the  GSP  100,000 e.u.a. 
D.  Trade  promotion  and  measures  to assist 
regional  integration 
token  entry 
The  token  entry  for  trade  promotion  and  measures  to assist regional 
integration clearly indicates that no action  is  envisaged  in this area for 
1978. 
Coordination  between  donor  countries 
15.  Administrative complications  represent a  formidable  barrier to trade, 
particularly for  the poorest  of the developing  countries.  We  indicated 
above that greater coordination  is  required  of  the  various  concessions  offered 
by the  Community  :  national administrations  may  have  problems  administering 
equitably a  Community  import  regime  of growing  complexity. 
Equally,  it is  important  that  donor  countries  should try,  as  far  as  is 
possible,  to harmonize  their preferential offers.  At  present  each  donor 
offers  a  separate list of products,  under  widely differing conditions  and 
customs  rates.  Greater harmonization  would  facilitate  enormously the ability 
of the  developing  countries to use the offers made. 
List of beneficiary countries 
16.  The  list of countries benefitting  from  the Community's  offer  is  very 
disparate,  including  some  of the poorest nations,  others with per capita GDP 
equal to or greater than that of certain  areas  of the  Community  and  East 
European  nations  such  as  Yugoslavia  and  Roumania. 
The  mere  fact  of a  high  GDP  does  not  reduce  the development  requirements 
of a  country urgently seeking  important long-term  sources  of produce  to take 
over  when  short-term  sources  of wealth,  such  as oil,  come  to an  end. 
There  does,  however,  seem  to  be  room  for  some  modification to the list, 
as  requested  in  the  past by  the  Committee  on  Agriculture. 
Little has  been  done.  The  Commission  has  entrenched itself behind the' 
political difficulties of altering  a  list established by  UNCTAD  and  the neces-
sity to confer with  other  donor  countries.  The  Commission  should  indicate 
whether  its consultations are  one  day to  come  to conclusion.  If success  is 
unlikely,  the Commission,  despite the  sensitiveness  of the  issue,  should act. 
Each  donor  draws  up  its own  list of beneficiaries. 
Some  room  for  manoeuvre  exists. 
- 28-
These  lists vary. 
PE  -49. 985/fin. Reduction  in  customs  duties 
17.  On  the basis  of  a  utilization rate of  55%,  the Commission  calculates that 
the reduction  in  customs  rates  for  1978  should  be  of the order  of 354m. e.u.a. 
The  Commission  asked,  however,  that these  figures  be  treated with caution. 
Consultation of the European  Parliament  and the  GATT  negotiations 
18.  In  the course  of the recent  GATT  negotiations,  forty-four  developing 
countries requested,  but  eleven  developed  countries,  that the list of tariff 
and  non-tariff concessions  be  brought  into effect before the conclusion  of the 
Tokyo  Round.  The  Community  has  stated that it will give partial effect to 
the request,  part of which shall  be  made  erga  omnes ·and part through  inclusion 
in  the generalized preferences. 
Clearly,  if the  Community  has  already  indicated that it will grant con-
cessions  on  the products  contained  in  the Commission's  present proposal,  one 
can  question  the utility of the  European  Parliament  giving  its opinion at 
this stage.  The  decisions have  been  largely taken.  This  is not  to be 
critical of the procedure adopted  in the  GATT  negotiations;  but if such  a 
procedure  is  to be  followed,  the European  Parliament  needs  to be  informed 
during  the  negotiations  so that  its opinion  may  be  taken  into account. 
Conclusions 
19.  The  Community's  offer  for  1978  of generalized preferences  in the agricul-
tural sector  is a  very modest  one,  including eleven  new  products  and  no tariff 
improvements  for  products  already listed.  The  worth  of the offer  increases 
from  1,235  m.  e.u.a.  to 1,300  m.  e.u.a .•  The  proposed  improvement  should 
present  no difficulties to European  producers. 
There  exist,  however,  a  number  of ancillary problems to which the Committee 
on  Agriculture wishes  to draw attention. 
20.  There  is  a  growing  need  for greater coordination  of the  increasing number 
of preferential  import  arrangements.  Administrative complexity and  conflict 
with Lome  and Association partners  must  be  avoided.  Themability of national 
administrations to operate an  increasingly complex  import  regime  may  frustrate, 
of itself, the aim of increasing trade with  developing  countries. 
21.  Efforts must  be  directed towards helping the  least developed nations. 
The  lack of expertise  by  those  countries  in  administrative  and  marketing 
tec~hn iques,  required  to benefit  from  the preferences  system,  has  proved  a 
serious  obstacle.  The  Committee  on Agriculture would  like greater evidence 
that the  Community's  efforts to provide assistance  in this area have made  an 
adequate contribution. 
- 29- PE  49. 985/fin. 22.  At  the  same  time,  the Community  should  endeavour  to seek greater 
harmonization  in  the offers of the  donor  countries,  so minimizing  the adminis-
trative difficulties of beneficiary countries. 
23.  The  Commission,  in its Explanatory Statement, seems  to indicate that 
Member  States are  not  sufficiently flexible  in their application of the gener-
alized·preferences,  so preventing  developing  countries  from  benefitting  fully. 
Greater  information  should  be  supplied  on  tHs  point;  and  the Commission  should 
propose  concrete  measures  where  necessary. 
24.  In  the  past,  a  limited  number  of the richest of the developing nations 
have  benefitted  from  generalized preferences.  The  Commission  should  indicate 
measures  it proposes  to rectify this  situation,  including modification of the 
list of beneficiaries. 
25.  The  Committee regrets  the  inadequate nature  of the Explanatory Statement, 
despite certain  improvements  which  have  been  made  (clearer  indication  of new 
products  covered,  together with  the  changes  in tariff rates)  ..  More  informa-
tion  is required,  particularly on  the  degree  to which  the least  .Q.e_ve~O_!:)ed  . · 
nations benefit  from  the  agricultural products  included  in the  t;:o~fty'  S·· 
offer. 
26.  Finally,  the  Committee  on Agriculture notes  that the  1978 offer was 
largely determined  in  the course of the  GATT  negotiations.  Doubts  may  be 
cast,  therefore,  on  the value of the European  Parliament giving its opinion 
at this  time. 
27.  The  majority  of  the  members  of  the  Committee  on  Agriculture,  considering 
that there  had  been  insufficient  time  to  re-examine  the  proposals  and  the 
draft opinion,  abstained  in  the  vote  on  the draft opinion. 
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EEC  IMPORT  LEVELS  OF  NEW  AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS  IN  1978  SCHEME 
{197&,'  000  EUR") 
! 
I  Harm 
Product  Total Extra - 9 
for  slaughter  84,625 
Other horses  14,764 
Locust  lobster  L  698 
Octopus  '  (1) 
Drumsticks,  marrows  and  pumkins  24,061 
and  others 
Dried garlic  (1) 
Mexico  1 ime  464 
Water  melons  (l) 
Mixture  of fruit containing  added  )  ) 
sugar,  packings  than  1  kg.  )  ) 
)  ) 
ditto,  less  than  1  kg.  )  14  ) 
)  ) 
ditto,  not  containing  added  sugar,)  ) 
4.5 kg.  or more  )  ) 
'  )  ) 
I ditto,  less  than  4.5 kg.  )  ) 
!  --
(1)  Tariff division  too small to provide statistical information 
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• OPINION  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  AFFAIRS 
Letter  from  Lord  ARDWICK,  member  of  the  Committee,  to the  Chairman 
of the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation. 
Luxembourg,  30  September  1977 
Dear  Mr  Chairman, 
1  At its meeting of  29  and  30 September  1977  the Committee  on  Economic 
and  Monetary Affairs considered the proposals  concerning the scheme of 
generalised tariff preferences  for  1978.  As  the Council  asked the Par-
liament  to give  an  opinion by  October but only  forwarded  the proposals 
during the  summer  recess  (18  August  1S77)  the Committee was  unable to have 
a  thorough debate  on  the Commission's  proposals.  Last year  the Committee 
on  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs had  the  same  problem with such  a  restricted 
time schedule and  found it impossible to give  a  written opinion.  This is 
deplorable  as  generalised tariff preferences have  an  important  economic 
impact,  which  would  merit closer consideration by the Committee  on  Economic 
and  Monetary Affairs  than  is  now possible. 
The  Commission has  chosen  for  the  1978  scheme  a  prudent course,  having 
regard  to the difficult economic  situation.  For  industrial products,  the 
Commission  proposes  the maintenance of the 1977  scheme with  a  number  of 
improvements  and  some  administrative adjustments.  The ceilings  for  some 
industrial products  other  than textiles will be raised,  but  in sectors 
currently in  a  difficult situation  (iron,  steel,  petroleum products,  foot-
wear,  plywood)  the 1977  arrangements  are to be maintained.  The Committee 
on  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs  approves  these proposals,  but emphasises 
- 32  PE  49  •. 98'51.~~. that it is insufficient to protect those troubled  sectors  simply by  imposing 
a  more  restrictive import  regime;  those sectors  also need  an  appropriate 
structural policy.  The  same is true  for  the textile sector.  The cri'tical 
state of the textile industry in various  regions  makes  any  increase in the 
present ceiling  impossible.  The Commission  proposes  consequently to retain 
the 1977  arrangen1ents  with which the Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary 
sector are being discussed 
a  report by  Mr  Normanton. 
Affairs  agrees.  The  problems  of this industrial 
in detail in the Committee  and  are the subject of 
The Committee would  cite this report,  to present its detailed view of the 
policy in this sector.  It will be presented shortly to the plenary. 
The Committee stresses  once more  the need  for  a  revision of the list of 
beneficiary countries.  As  this has  been  postponed until after  1980,  more 
efforts  should be undertaken to  achieve  a  more balanced distribution of the 
benefits  among  the present beneficiary countries which would  concentrate more 
on the poorest countries  and  less  on  countries with  a  high standard of develop-
ment. 
Further  efforts to get more  poor  countries to use GSP  are necessary. 
The  degree of utilisation of only  6~/o in 1976  is perhaps largely due  to the 
unnecessary complexity of  the  administrative procedures.  The pommission 
should  lose  no  time  in  simplifying the  procedures. 
Finally,  the Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary Affairs points out that 
insufficient statistical data  are available about the economic,  social  and 
financial  impact  of  the GSP.  This  makes  it difficult to  judge the proposals 
from  the  economic point of view.  A  fuller knowledge  of the impact of the 
GSP  will be vital if the future  development  of the system is to be properly 
assessed. 
Please consider this letter as  the opinion  for  your  committee  on  this 
scheme  of generalised tariff preferences. 
Yours  sincerely, 
(sgd)  Lord  ARDWICK 
1Present:  Mr  Glinne,  chairman;  Mr  Notenboom,  vice-chairman;  Lord Ardwick, 
rapporteur;  Mr  Nyborg,  Mr  De  Keersmaeker,  Mr  Lange,  Mr  Schmidt  (deputising 
for  Mr  Prescott),  Mr  van  der  Mei,  Mr  Spinelli 
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